CEA Tech, Centre Microélectronique de Provence, 880 avenue de Mimet, Gardanne, France, Laboratoire de Mathématiques de Versailles, UVSQ, CNRS, Université Paris-Saclay, Versailles, France, CEA LETI, 17 rue des Martyrs, Grenoble Cedex 9, France

The field of Pairing Based Cryptography (PBC) has seen recent advances in the simplification of their calculations and in the implementation of original protocols for security and privacy. Like most cryptographic algorithms, PBC implementations on embedded devices are exposed to physical attacks such as side channel attacks, which have been shown to recover the secret points used in some PBC-based schemes. Various countermeasures have consequently been proposed. The present paper provides an updated review of the state of the art countermeasures against side channel attacks that target PBC implementations. We especially focus on a technique based on point blinding/randomization. We propose a collision based side-channel attack against an implementation embedding the point randomization countermeasure. It is, to the best of our knowledge, the first proposed attack against this countermeasure used in the PBC context and this raises questions about the validation of countermeasures for complex cryptographic schemes such as PBC. We also discuss about ways of thwarting our attack. Copyright © 2017 by SCITEPRESS - Science and Technology Publications, Lda. All rights reserved.

Collision Side-channel Attack, Countermeasures, Miller's Algorithm, Pairing-based Cryptography

Cryptography, Electronic commerce, Public key cryptography, Radar countermeasures, Random processes, Cryptographic algorithms, Cryptographic schemes, Miller's algorithm, Pairing-based cryptography, Physical attacks, Secure implementation, Security and privacy, State of the art, Side channel attack