CEA-Tech, Gardanne, France, Inria, Paris, France, CEA-Leti, Grenoble, France, CEA-List, Saclay, France, ENSM-SE, Saint-Étienne, France

LS-Designs are a family of SPN-based block ciphers whose linear layer is based on the so-called interleaved construction. They will be dedicated to low-end devices with high performance and low-resource constraints, objects which need to be resistant to physical attacks. In this paper we describe a complete Differential Fault Analysis against LS-Designs and also on other families of SPN-based block ciphers. First we explain how fault attacks can be used against their implementations depending on fault models. Then, we validate the DFA in a practical example on a hardware implementation of SCREAM running on an FPGA. The faults have been injected using electromagnetic pulses during the execution of SCREAM and the faulty ciphertexts have been used to recover the key’s bits. Finally, we discuss some countermeasures that could be used to thwart such attacks. © 2017, Springer International Publishing AG.

DFA, EM fault attacks, Lightweight cryptography, LS-Designs, SCREAM, SPN-based block ciphers

Cryptography, Electromagnetic pulse, Hardware, Lyapunov methods, Security of data, Block ciphers, End-devices, Fault model, Hardware implementations, Light-weight cryptography, Physical attacks, Resource Constraint, SCREAM, Side channel attack